Implementation of Complementary Access
The IAEA must typically give the State 24-hours advance notice of Complementary Access (CA),
but only two-hours notice if the CA is sought in conjunction with a
current IAEA inspection or design information verification
(DIV). The advance notice from the Agency must be in writing
and specify the purpose of the CA and the activities to be conducted.
CA will only take place during regular working hours and
representatives of the State have the right to accompany the IAEA
inspectors during CA.
If the objective of the CA is to resolve a question or inconsistency on
a declaration, the IAEA will give the State the opportunity to clarify
or resolve the issue or question. This will be done before
the IAEA requests the CA, unless the delay in access would prejudice
the purpose of the CA.
Under Article 5. of the AP, the IAEA has the right to request access to:
- All places on the sites of facilities;
- Locations outside facilities (LOFs);
- Uranium mines, uranium concentration plants, and thorium
concentration plants;
- Locations of source material declared under article
2.a.(vi);
- Locations of exempted nuclear material declared under
article 2.a.(vii);
- Locations of certain intermediate- and high-level waste
processing declared under article 2.a.(viii);
- Decommissioned facilities;
- Nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D locations;
- Nuclear-related manufacturing locations;
- Locations of imported Annex II items; and
- Locations not declared, for location-specific environmental
sampling.
The IAEA CA kit may contain radiation detection instruments, a global
positioning system (GPS), and a digital camera.
Depending on the location of the CA the IAEA may carry out some of the
following activities:
- Visual observation;
- Collection of environmental samples;
- Utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices;
- Examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping
records;
- Examination of records relevant to the quantities, origin,
and deposition of nuclear material;
- Item counting of nuclear material;
- Placement of seals, and other identifying and
tamper-indicating devices; and
- Non-destructive measurements and sampling.
