Declarable information includes, but is not limited to the following:
To make this website as concise as possible, the following sections of Article 2. are not described here for the noted reasons:
However, national regulations related to AP reporting should include references to even these requirements. When a set of declarations is submitted to the Agency, it must be complete. If there is nothing to declare for a given article, Serbia must specify for that article “Nothing to declare.”
Article 2.a.(i): Fuel Cycle-Related Research and Development (government-sponsored)
The AP further defines nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development to mean “those activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the following:
Activities not included are those related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and improved maintenance.” However, it should be noted that certain basic research might constitute a first pilot step towards nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development, and the IAEA may ask about it if they are aware of its existence.
For the purposes of the AP declaration, a distinction must be made between theoretical/basic science, and applied R&D. It may be helpful to ask certain questions to clarify this distinction:
The language “. . . carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of . . .’’ is intended to cover any nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D in which the Serbian Government is involved, either in pursuit of its own interests or on behalf of any other entity. This includes licensing of the activity.
Article 2.a.(i), together with information declared under comprehensive safeguards on R&D activities that involve nuclear material, provides the IAEA with a complete view of nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D that the government sponsors in Serbia. Article 2.b.(i) covers similar information regarding private sector R&D not involving nuclear material that is specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing, and the processing of certain nuclear waste. When combined, this information gives the Agency a good view of Serbia’s fuel cycle R&D and improves the basis for confirming the overall consistency of the Serbia nuclear program.
This article creates a requirement to report certain R&D activities not involving nuclear material. There are nuclear processes and associated process equipment that can be developed to an advanced level without the introduction of nuclear material. An example is development of a sub-process for fuel fabrication, but using surrogate (substitute) materials that mimic some of the properties of uranium. If the process is fully developed using uranium, that activity would then be reported under comprehensive safeguards since nuclear material is involved. Nuclear fuel-cycle related R&D projects typically proceed through a common set of stages. Some of those stages involve nuclear material, but many do not. The graphic below shows the stages of R&D in green that do not require the use of nuclear material and are declarable under 2.a.(i) or 2.b.(i). The material in the far-right stage in red would be declared under the CSA and the activity under 2.a.(iii).
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The phrase “related to any process or system development aspect” is intended in a broad sense to include R&D to improve the performance of an existing process or system, as well as R&D to develop a new process or system. It also includes components of a multi-component R&D project in which nuclear material is not present even though one or more of the components does involve nuclear material.Nuclear material is defined by the IAEA as source material and special fissionable material (SFM). Some countries use the term special nuclear material (SNM), which is somewhat different from SFM. SNM includes all plutonium, while SFM includes only Pu-239 or any material containing Pu-239. In applying the AP, the IAEA’s definition of nuclear material must be used, and this includes only Pu-239, not other isotopes of plutonium.
This is important because Article 2.a.(i) covers R&D that does not involve nuclear material, and regarding plutonium this means R&D that does not involve Pu-239. So if the R&D involves Pu-238 without any Pu-239, it is declarable under AP Article 2.a.(i).
Article 2.a.(iii): Buildings on Each Site
This article and the associated access provisions help the IAEA ensure that no undeclared nuclear material or activities are co-located with declared nuclear facilities. This is important because undeclared nuclear facilities would benefit from sharing the infrastructure of manpower, technology, equipment, and services in place to support elements of the declared program. The information provided under this article would be the basis for actions to obtain credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities on sites. It would also be used for planning complementary access to the sites and for evaluating consistency with the results of access activities and other information available to the IAEA.
As an example, Serbia will need to report all buildings on the site of [insert example site name], together with a map of the site.
In addition, all buildings on LOF sites will need to be declared. An example would be depleted uranium shielding contained in a medical therapy unit, most likely in a hospital. Alternatively, if the material is exempted from comprehensive safeguards (and therefore not a site), then the material may be required to be declared under AP Article 2.a.(vii).
Article 2.a.(iv): Nuclear-related Manufacturing
Annex I specifies certain manufacturing activities related to enrichment, reactors, reprocessing, and nuclear material handling or transport. The AP requires a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in manufacturing, assembly, or construction activities for the following. This equipment and non-nuclear material is especially designed or prepared for nuclear use (as opposed to “dual-use” equipment that can be used for nuclear and non-nuclear applications).
Definitions for these activities are contained in AP Annex I, which often references Annex II. This information is meant to provide a basis for assurances that manufacturing activities in the areas covered by Annex I are consistent with Serbia’s declared nuclear program, including nuclear trade. The information should provide an overview of the infrastructure directly supporting Serbia’s and/or other States’ nuclear fuel cycles.
The AP requires a “Description of the Scale of Operations” for each relevant location. This means if any of these activities are performed during the reporting period, Serbia should include a brief description of the activity and its production level in enough detail so that the IAEA can determine the relationship to Serbia’s nuclear fuel cycle program, taking into account any exports.
Article 2.a.(v): Uranium and Thorium Mines and Concentration Plants
This information helps the Agency have a complete understanding of a country’s nuclear material holdings. This includes the capacity to produce source material, both in operating and closed-down mines.
In Republic of Serbia there are no active mines and ore reprocessing and concentration plants.
Article 2.a.(vi): Source Material
This article deals with source material that is before the starting point of detailed nuclear material accountancy procedures as required by a CSA. Under comprehensive safeguards, the IAEA already receives reports on exports and imports of such source material if it is for nuclear purposes, so that is why AP Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) only require information for non-nuclear purposes. In addition, Article 2.a.(vi)(a) requires a declaration of source material stocks for nuclear or non-nuclear use. This information will complement information on source material received under comprehensive safeguards to give the IAEA as complete a picture as practical of all source material within Serbia. The IAEA will use this information to confirm the consistency between Serbia’s declared nuclear program and its holdings of nuclear material. It will be also used to confirm the consistency of the exports and imports of this material with imports and exports declared by other countries.
AP Article 2.a.(vi) specifies minimum threshold quantities for declaring the presence, import, or export of source material. These thresholds are based on the amounts associated with a single location as well as the total amounts associated with all of Serbia. Therefore, all quantities greater than 1 metric ton (1000 kilograms) should be declared to the Serbian radiation protection and nuclear safety agency (SRPNA), so Serbia can determine its aggregated inventories, imports, and exports.
Article 2.a.(vii): Nuclear Material Exempted from Safeguards
This article is intended to provide the Agency with as complete a picture as practical of all nuclear material within Serbia relevant to actual or potential nuclear activities.
Serbia currently has nuclear material exempted from safeguards. In the future Serbia may want to exempt certain material, such as depleted uranium used as shielding in hospitals. Exempting such material would remove the need to declare the hospital room as a site under comprehensive safeguards, but would require the material to be declared under this article of the AP. Because of this, the SRPNA should keep track of the locations and amounts of any exempted nuclear material.
Article 2.a.(ix): Exports and Imports of Nuclear-related Equipment and Non-nuclear Material
This article requires information regarding export of specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of the AP. Upon specific request by the IAEA, confirmation of information provided by another State on imports into Serbia of specified equipment and material must also be provided.
The purpose of this article is to obtain information on a
country’s international transfers in nuclear fuel cycle-related
equipment and material. The information contributes
substantially to the transparency of the country’s nuclear and
nuclear-related activities and to the IAEA’s understanding of those
activities. The information on international transfers of
equipment and non-nuclear material covered by Annex II will be compared
for consistency with the exporting and importing countries’ declared
nuclear programs. This will provide indications of where
transfers are occurring and where an infrastructure exists that could
support nuclear activities that are not part of declared nuclear
programs. Should questions arise, an importing country may be
asked to confirm an exporting country’s declaration.
With the emergence of globalization and clandestine networks, the risk for a State of being unknowingly involved in illicit trafficking of sensitive goods has dramatically increased. The AP helps a State to be aware of export and import of nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material on territories under its jurisdiction. This exchange of information is a key element against the risk of proliferation through non-State actors like clandestine networks.
This article requires that Serbia provide a
quarterly declaration describing any exports of Annex II items during
the reporting period. Nuclear export regulations for Annex II
items typically provide the information required to be declared to the
It is important to note that while nearly all declarations are made on an annual basis, declarations of exports of Annex II items are required quarterly. Declarations are due 60 days after the end of each quarter, and are to include exports during that previous quarter. If the Agency requests confirmation of an Annex II import into Serbia, SRPNA must respond within 60 days.
Article 2.a.(x): Ten-year Plan
This article requires a general plan for the next 10-year
period regarding development of Serbia’s nuclear fuel
cycle, including planned fuel cycle R&D activities.
This includes plans for both government-sponsored development as well
as private sector development that have been approved by the
government. This part of the declaration enables the IAEA to
determine that the declared nuclear energy program and fuel cycle
R&D are consistent with plans for future development of the
nuclear fuel cycle.
The “General Plans for Nuclear Fuel Cycle-Related Research and Development Activities” column in the declaration should include a general description of each R&D plan, its overall objectives, any target date or overall schedule for the R&D and the locations involved. Another part of the declaration under this part of the AP focuses on “General Plans for Development of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle” and should include a brief statement of the plans for nuclear facilities, including the intended results, any target completion dates, overall schedule, and the locations involved. This declaration should focus on what has actually been approved by the State’s authorities (i.e., what is “real,” not what is hoped for).
Serbia government agencies with responsibility for nuclear fuel cycle development or licensing should be consulted for any approved plans.
Article 2.b.(i): Fuel Cycle-Related Research and Development (private sector)
This article is the same as 2.a.(i) except that it applies to
private sector R&D not funded or licensed by the State and only
to R&D related to enrichment, reprocessing, and certain waste
processing. Taken together, information from these two
articles gives the Agency a good picture of Serbia’s
fuel cycle-related R&D program that does not involve nuclear
material. A State must make every reasonable effort to
provide the information specified in Article 2.b.(i).
This requires the Serbia government to maintain cognizance of nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D not funded or licensed by the government and carried out anywhere in Serbia. This is important not only for international safeguards but to keep Serbia from being unknowingly involved in sensitive activities.
Article 2.b.(ii): Activities Outside a Site
This article, together with 2.a.(iii), is intended to provide
assurance that no undeclared nuclear material or activities are
co-located with declared nuclear facilities in order to utilize the
infrastructure in place to support declared activities.
Article 2.b.(ii) provides the Agency with the right to information
concerning activities outside a site but which the Agency considers may
be functionally related to the activities on that site. If
the information is not sufficient to resolve the Agency’s questions,
the information will be used to plan any needed complementary
access. A State must make every reasonable effort to provide
the information specified in Article 2.b.(ii).
Action is required only upon request of the IAEA.
Article 2.c: Amplifications or Clarifications
This article helps ensure the correct understanding by the
declared information under Article 2. It may also contribute
resolving Agency questions without recourse to complementary access.
Action is required only upon request of the IAEA. Responses may be in a free format letter or in the format provided in the Protocol Reporter software, which is preferable.